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"DEAR DIARY-CAN YOU BE USED
AGAINST ME?": THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT AND DIARIES
[I] t frightens me to think that the private thoughts, hopes,
dreams and despairs of all our citizens can now be seized
by the government.
Senator Bob Packwood'
INTRODUCTI ON
The recent struggle between the Senate Select Committee on
Ethics and Senator Bob Packwood over enforcement of an Ethics
Committee subpoena for Senator Packwood's personal diaries frames
an important and unsettled issue in Fifth Amendment law: the extent,
if any, of a Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of personal
diaries.2 In 1992, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics began an
investigation of Senator Bob Packwood's alleged sexual misconduct,
intimidation of victims and misuse of staff in efforts to intimidate and
discredit the alleged victims. 3 The Ethics Committee investigation ulti-
mately included a subpoena for over eight thousand pages of a per-
sonal diary Senator Packwood maintained since 1969. 4
Packwood offered information from his diaries during his Ethics
Committee deposition, thus informing the committee that the diaries
existed and contained information relevant to the investigation!' Pack-
wood and the committee then negotiated a deal pursuant to which
Packwood allowed the committee to examine the diaries." Packwood
broke the agreement after the committee sought information from the
diaries outside of the initial scope of the investigation.'' In response,
Katharine Seelye, Packwood Gives up, Agreeing to Deliver Diary to Committre,N,Y. TIM Es, Mar.
15, 1994, at. A21.
2 See interview (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1993) (Transcript on [IX'S) (according
to lbroter U.S. Attorney Joseph DiCenova, Supreme Court has not decided Filth Amendment.
Protection for diaries).
3 See 139 CONG. REC. S 14,725 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bryan). See generally
139 Cor46. REC. S14,725 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) through 1 59 CONG. Rec. S14,832 (daily ed. Nov.
2, 1993) for complete record of Senate debate and vote on the Packwood diaries subpoena.
' 1 See 139 CONG. REC. S14,735-36 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
• See 139 CONG. REC. 514,726 (daily ed. Nov, 1, 1993) (statement of Sen, Bryan); see also 139
CONG, Ritc. 514,733 (daily ed, Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
139 CONC. REC. S I 4,72ti (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
7 See id. (statement of Sen. Bryan). The committee discovered information that indicated
possible additional violations of Senate rules as well as public laws. Id.
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the committee issued a subpoena for the diaries, and the Senate voted
overwhelmingly to allow the committee to seek enforcement of the
subpoena in federal court. 8
In February of 1994, in response to Senator Packwood's effort to
invoke Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of his diaries, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of any personal pa-
pers, and therefore does not protect Senator Packwood's personal
diaries from the reach of the Ethics Committee subpoena.° Accord-
ingly, the D.C. District ordered Packwood to comply with the subpoena
and turn his diaries over to the committee. 10 In March of 1994, the
Supreme Court denied Senator Packwood's request for a stay of the
district court order pending his appeal." On March 15, 1994, Pack-
wood, citing legal bills of over $1 million, discontinued his appeal of
the D.C. District's order, and agreed to provide the Senate Ethics
Committee with his diaries.' 2
Three United States Supreme Court opinions, spanning nearly
100 years, bear on whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents
of any documents.'`' In the earliest, Boyd v. United States, the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment protected an individual from compelled
production of all personal documents." In so holding, the Boyd Court
struck down an Act to combat customs duties fraud that gave prose-
cuting attorneys authority to compel documents necessary for their
case. 18 The Boyd Court recognized a broad Fifth Amendment protec-
tion of privacy against compelled disclosure of personal documents. 18
By 1976, in Fisher v. United States, the Court shifted the focus of Fifth
Amendment analysis from the contents of the documents to the act of
producing those documents, at least with respect to documents pre-
pared for taxpayers by their accountants. 17 In Fisher, the Court held
2 See 139 CONG. REC. 514,832 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1993). In light of Senator Packwood's
potential criminal violations, the Department of Justice subsequently issued a subpoena for
Senator Packwood's diaries. See Craig Winneker, Heard on Me Hi14 ROLL CALL, Jan. 13, 1994.
9 See Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Senator Bob Packwood, Misc., No. 93-0362 (TPJ),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *20 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 1994).
See Packwood, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 472, at *21.
II See Bob Packwood, Applicant v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, No. A-704, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 2044 at *5 (Mar. 2, 1994).
12 See Seelye, supra note 1, at A21.
13 See Glenn R. Simpson, Packwood Precedents Go Back As Far As 1884, ROLL CALL, Dec. 23,
1993.
14 See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S 616, 535, 638 (1886).
15 See id. at 619-20.
16 See id. at 630.
17 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976).
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that although the Fifth Amendment did not protect the contents of
the documents in question, the Fifth Amendment could protect the
act of production of those documents when the act resulted in an
incriminating testimonial communication.'" According to the Court,
an act of production became testimonial when the act verified a docu-
ment's existence, possession or authentication.'" In 1984, in United
States v. Doe, the Court relied on the Fisher act of production analysis
to deny Fifth Amendment protection to the records of a sole proprie-
tor.'"
Neither Fisher nor Doe explicitly overruled Boyd, nor determined
whether the Fifth Amendment continues to protect the contents of
certain personal documents, 21 Thus, circuit and district courts have
split over any remaining contents-based Fifth Amendment protection
for personal documents. 22 In 1985, the Supreme Court appeared inter-
ested in resolving the issue when it granted certiorari in United States
v. (Under Seal). 23 Under Seal involved a challenge to a subpoena for
various personal documents, including checking and savings account
records, deeds, mortgages and others.24 Prior to argument, however,
the Court vacated the case as moot. 25
Recently, the Court has foregone opportunities to clarify the na-
ture of Fifth Amendment protection for personal diaries.'" In July of
1993, in In Re Grand Jury Duces Tecum, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that the Fifth Amendment
provides no protection for the contents of voluntarily prepared, per-
sonal documents. 27 Although Duces Tecum specifically involved inti-
mately personal documents, in January of 1994, the Court, by unani-
"See id. at 410-11.
19 See id. at 410.
"United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984).
21 Doe, 465 U.S. at 610 (Court notes that Fisher declined to determine Filth Amendment.
protection for documents); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Court explicitly declines to determine Fifth
Amendment shield for private papers); see also Gordon E. Hunt, Note, Fifth Amendment Limita-
dons on the Compelled Prtxtudion of Evidence. 24 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 801, 806 (1987); Barbara
Daniels Davis, Note, The Fifth Amendment and Production of Documents After United States v. Doe,
66 B.U. L. Rmv. 95 (1986).
22 See infra notes 202-85 for discussion of circuit split..
2 '5 See 745 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub. nom. United States v. Doe, 469 U.S. 1188
(1985); see also Hunt, supra note 21, at 806.
24 See United States v. (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834, 835-36 (4111 Cir. 1984).
25 See United States v. Doe, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985) (not same case as United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605 (1984) discussed elsewhere).
26 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub. nom.
Doe v. United States, No. 93-523, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1170, at *1 (Jan. 24, 1994).
27 Grand fury Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 92-93.
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mous vote, denied certiorari and declined to hear the appeal. 28 In
March of 1994, the Supreme Court relied in part on its unanimous
denial of certiorari in Duces Tecum to deny Senator Packwood a stay of
the D.C. District order pending his appeal. 29 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the Court will issue a stay upon a finding that at least four
justices would vote to review the issue in a petition for certiorari."
Pointing to the recent denial of certiorari in Duces Tecum, Rehnquist
concluded that four justices would not vote to review the Fifth Amend-
ment issue in Senator Packwood's case, and thus denied a stay.31
The effort to compel production of Senator Packwood's personal
diaries provokes strong reaction from many of the millions of Ameri-
cans who keep their most intimately personal musings in their diaries."
According to one writer, once a court enforces the Packwood sub-
poena, no hiding place will provide adequate diary protection from a
persistent litigant." According to the American Civil Liberties Union,
fundamental constitutional principals of privacy weigh in on Pack-
wood's side." Senator Packwood, terminating his appeal in the wake
of the Court's denial of the stay of the D.C. District's order, expressed
concern that the private "thoughts, hopes, dreams and despairs of all
our citizens can now be seized by the government." 35 Many circuit and
district courts apparently agree." Thus, the Supreme Court, by denying
both certiorari to the parties in Duces Tecum and a stay pending appeal
to Senator Packwood, has passed up two opportunities to clarify an
area of Fifth Amendment law left ambiguous since 1984. 37
This Note argues that the Court's opinions in Fisher and Doe, by
limiting a judicially imputed Fifth Amendment protection of privacy,
28 See Doe v. United States, No. 93-523, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1 170 at *1 (Jan. 24, 1994).
29 See Bob Packwood, Applicant V. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, No. A-704, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 2044, at *5 (Mar, 2, 1994).
3° Id. at *2.
31
 See id. at *5.
32 See, e.g., Bonnie Miller Rubin, Them Seeking Words To Live By Still Write 'Dear Diary; OH.
Taut., NOV. 14, 1993, section 2 at 3; Lena Williams, Plivate Thoughts, Public Revelations, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1993, at Cl. Williams notes that since 1980, annual global sales of bound diaries have
doubled to ten million. See Williams, Supra, at C4. Americans buy five million per year, and have
been served since 1988 by a magazine entitled Diarist's Journal. See id.
33 See Williams, supra note 32, at Cl.
34 See Nadine Strossen, Packwood Rightly Argued for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 9, 1993, at A32
(letter to editor from American Civil Liberties Union President).
33 See Seelye, supra note 1, at A21.
36 See infra notes 263-82.
37 See supra notes 26 and 29 and accompanying text; see also Interview (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 3, 1993) (Transcript on LEXIS) (according to former U.S. Attorney Joseph
DiGenova, Supreme Court has not decided Fifth Amendment Protection for diaries); Davis, supra
note 21, at 95; Hunt, supra note 21, at 806.
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effectively overruled Boyd with respect to all documents regardless of
the private nature of their contents. An extension to personal docu-
ments of the penumbral right of privacy emanating from the Fifth and
other amendments is inappropriate in both practice and policy. Rather,
the act of production analysis outlined in Fisher and Doe serves to
protect truly intimate and personal documents without providing a
haven of protection for incriminating documents in which a privacy
interest is lacking. This Note concludes that the modern standard of
Fifth Amendment analysis better protects truly intimate, personal
documents while providing lower courts with a workable standard to
apply in document subpoena cases. Section I examines the protection
of privacy within the Fifth Amendment as well as the penumbral right
to privacy emanating from the Fifth and other amendments." Section
II reviews circuit and district court attempts to define the remaining
scope, if any, of a contents-based Fifth Amendment protection for
personal papers, in light of the Court's opinions in Fisher and Doe."
Section III explains why a contents-based protection does not provide
an appropriate foundation for Fifth Amendment protection. 4° Section
III also shows how the act of production analysis established in Fisher
and Doe provides an easier standard for lower court application and
will actually better protect truly intimate personal documents such as
diaries.'"
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, in
relevant part, "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . ."" The origins of the Self-In-
crimination Clause date back to at least the Sixth Century, A.D.° By
the close of the Seventeenth Century, the clause began to take root in
America." During the legislative session of the First Congress in 1789,
Representative James Madison introduced the Fifth Amendment, in-
cluding the Self-incrimination Clause, as one of several amendments
he wished to propose to the states for ratification.° The First Congress
38 See infra notes 42-201 and accompanying text.
as infra notes 202-85 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 286-328 and accompanying text.
'IL SW infra notes 329-40 and accompanying text.
4-'4 U.S. CONST. amend. V, el. 3.
45 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS or THE FIETH AMENDMENT 433 (1968); Davis, .supra note 21,
at 97.
44 See LEvv, supra note 43, at 367.
45 I ANNALS or CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales elE, 1789).
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ultimately included the Fifth Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights
proposed to the states on September 25, 1789.° The states completed
ratification by December 15, 1791. 47
Several policy underpinnings provide support for the privilege
against self-incrimination.° The inquisitorial proceedings of the Star
Chamber in the Middle Ages, for example, prompted a drive toward
a fair criminal procedure.° The idea of a protection against self-in-
crimination emerged as part of the transformation from an inquisito-
rial to an accusatorial criminal justice system fair to the accused. 5°
Sparse congressional debate over adoption of the Self-incrimination
Clause in America, however, left unclear whether the First Congress
simply embraced the same policies that prompted the development of
the self-incrimination concept in England, or sought additional safe-
guards with the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Arnendment.m
Absent clear original intent, the United States Supreme Court has
offered several policies underlying the privilege. 52 The Court has often
recognized the English, post-Star Chamber policies of fairness to the
accused in a criminal justice system. 53 Thus, on several occasions the
Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment exists to protect an accused
from compulsion to testify to his or her own detriment." The Court
has also imputed policies into the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment that appear to derive solely from the Court.55 In the 1964
decision, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, perhaps
the most explicit exposition of Fifth Amendment policy, the Court
identified seven fundamental values emanating from the Fifth Amend-
ment.56 The Court included a preference for an accusatorial rather
than inquisitorial criminal justice system, as well as a sense of fair play
between the state and the individual, a desire to protect the innocent,
and a respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
46 Id. at 88, 779.
47 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1994 at 437 (Robert Famighetti ed.).
46 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56-(1964). See
generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (1961); LEVY, supra note 43, at 331-32.
49 LEVY, supra note 43, at 331-32.
See id.
51 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 48, at 324-25.
52 See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56 (Court lists seven "fundamental values" reflected by
the Fifth Amendment).
53 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85, 88 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
54 See, e.g., Andresen, 427 U.S. at 470; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88; Couch, 409 U.S. at 327.
55 See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56; see alsoW1GmouE, supra note 48, at 318.
56 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56.
July 1994]	 FIFTH AMENDMENT AND DIARIES 	 971
right of the individual to a private enclave where he or she may lead
a private life. 67
The concept of a Fifth Amendment umbrella protection of an
individual's private enclave is simply a specific manifestation of a broader
Fifth Amendment protection of privacy frequently cited by the Court."
The scope of that policy, however, has varied considerably over time.°
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, the Court recognized
a broad, Fifth Amendment zone of privacy, which in conjunction with
other amendments established a broad right to privacy that prohibited
state restrictions of contraceptives.° Conversely, in 1976, in Fisher v.
United States, the Court recognized a limited Fifth Amendment protec-
tion of privacy that protected only against use of compelled, self-in-
criminating testimony. 6 '
Thus, the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment finds
support in various policies assigned to it. 62
 Some of the policies, such
as maintenance of a fair criminal justice system, tie directly to the
English origins of the privilege against self-incrimination.° Others,
such as the protection of privacy, derive from Court construction of
the Fifth Amendment, and vary significantly in scope over time." The
following material traces the sources and scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment with respect to personal privacy.
A. Boyd, Fisher and Doe: Privacy Based on Contents and Privacy
Based on Compulsion
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protected individuals
57 Id. at 55.
58 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Couch, 409 U.S. at 327; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 587 (1946); Boyd v. United Slates, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
55 See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399 (Fifth Amendment protection of privacy does not prevent
every invasion of privacy but only compelled, self-incriminating invasion of privacy); Couch, 409
U.S. at 327 (privilege protects inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484 (Firth Amendment creates broad zone of privacy around individual which in conjunc-
tion with other amendments establishes broad, general right to privacy); Murphy, 378 U.S, at 55
(privilege reflects our respect for right of an individual to private enclave of private life); Davis,
328 U.S. at 587 (privilege protects privacy of individual both in terms of right to be left alone
and right against use of compulsory production of evidence to he used against individual); !k d,
116 U.S. at 630 (Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect individuals front all invasions of home
and piracies of life).
64' See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
61 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399.
52
 WIGMORE, MOM note 48, at 318.
63 See LEVY, supra note 43, at 330-32.
" See supra note 59.
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from compelled production of private books and papers.° The case
involved an investigation of a shipping company's fraudulent non-pay-
ment of duties on imported glass, and arose when a government
attorney sought to compel production of the plaintiffs' shipping in-
voice for the glass.66 The Court characterized personal documents,
including the invoice, as important personal property of their owner,
and reasoned that forcing their removal via subpoena amounted to a
trespass.° Further, according to the Court, such an "invasion" violated
an individual's right of personal security and personal liberty. 68
The government charged the Boyd plaintiffs with fraudulent non-
payment of customs duties under an 1874 Act to enforce payment. 69
Section five of the Act allowed the prosecuting attorney to compel any
defendant to come to court at a specified date with specified docu-
ments. 7° To establish the quantity and value of the shipment at issue,
the prosecutor sought, under section five, to compel the invoice ac-
companying the shipment of glass. 71 Although the Boyd plaintiffs com-
plied with the subpoena, they objected on Fifth Amendment grounds.72
The jury found for the government and the circuit court affirmed."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court noted that neither the laws of England, nor
others in America, granted law enforcement such broad power to
compel the production of evidence." The Court first determined that
the Act violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that compulsion
under section five of the Act amounted to an unreasonable search and
65 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,634-35,638 (1886).
66 See id. at 618.
67 See id. at 627-28.
68 See id. at 630.
68 See id. at 617-18.
7U Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619-20. Section five read, in relevant pare
In all suits and proceedings other than criminal arising under any of the revenue
laws of the United States, the attorney representing dm government, whenever in
his belief any business book, invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the control
of, the defendant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the United
States, may make a written motion, particularly describing such book, invoice, or
paper, and setting forth the allegation which he expects it to prove; and thereupon
the court in which suit or proceeding is pending may, at its discretion, issue a notice
to the defendant or claimant to produce such book, invoice, or paper in court, at
a day and hour to be specified in said notice....
Id.
71 Id. at 618.
77 Id. at 618,621.
73 Id. at 618.
71 Id.
75 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-23.
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seizure. 7" The Court distinguished compelled production under sec-
don five from permissible searches and seizures of stolen goods, or
goods subject to unpaid duties." In those examples of permissible
seizures, either the true owner or the government possess an interest
superior to the privacy interest of the target of the search. 78 The Court
found the latter reasonable and acceptable, but concluded that com-
pelled production of personal papers advanced no governmental in-
terest beyond extortion of personal property to pin criminal liability
on the owner.• According to the Court, the government committed
the equivalent of a trespass in seizing an individual's private property—
in this case, papers. 8°
The Court discussed section five of the Act and the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments in the context of personal liberty and privacy, de-
scribing a near intersection of the two amenclments.81 Specifically, the
Court reasoned that in addition to an invasion of private property,
compelling the production of papers amounted to an invasion of a
person's indefeasible right of personal security and personal liberty."
After asserting that compelled production of an individual's private
books or papers contravenes the principles of a free government, the
Court concluded that the Act compelled an individual to incriminate
himself or herself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 85
Until -1976, the Court continued to recognize some form of Fifth
Amendment protection for the contents of personal documents, while
narrowing Boyd's holding with respect to less intimate documents.84 In
1910, in Wilson v. United States, the Court determined that the privilege
26 Id. at 622.
22 Id. at 624.
28 See id.
29 See id.
88 Lloyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28.
H 1 Id. at 630.
82 1d.
83 Id. at 631 -32, 635. justice Miller concurred separately to indicate his disagreement with
the majority's Fourth Amendment analysis, and to assert that the Fifth Amendment governed the
case. See id. at 639.
84 See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) (privilege applies to personal
docanneins containing intimate information about individual's private life); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (privilege exists where legitimate expectation of privacy exists);
SCIIIIIerbor v. Califirrnia, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (protection clearly reaches accused's
communications such as compliance with subpoena to produce private papers); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948) (privilege for personal papers does not exist for papers required to
he maintained under government regulation); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946)
(doctunents maintained and kept. at place of business not accorded same protection as private
papers); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 386 (1911) (privilege that exists for private papers
not available to corporations).
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existing for personal documents did not protect a representative of a
corporation from producing corporate documents. 85
 The Court noted
that the Boyd opinion emphasized the protection of personal docu-
ments and that Boyd implied that the character of corporate docu-
ments and the capacity in which they are held overrides a Fifth Amend-
ment claim. 88 In 1945, in Davis v. United States, the Court held that
records pertaining to gasoline rationing required to be kept at filling
stations could not find protection within the Fifth Amendment.87 The
Court recognized a broad protection for the contents of personal
documents in a private residence, and distinguished the rationing
documents based on their content and location. 88
 In 1973, in Couch v.
United States, the Court reiterated a contents-based Fifth Amendment
protection for documents, asserting that the protection respects a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought. 89 The Court
concluded that the Fifth Amendment would not protect documents
lacking a legitimate expectation of privacy.9° Finally, in extending the
Wilson holding to partnership documents in 1974, the Court noted
that Fifth Amendment protection extends to personal documents con-
taining intimate information about the individual's life."
In 1976, in Fisher v. United Stales, the Court held that compelled
production of personal tax records would not constitute incriminating
testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 92 In Fisher,
two taxpayers sought Fifth Amendment protection against an Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") summons for certain tax related documents. 93
In rejecting their claim, the Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
protects against compelled self-incrimination, and not the disclosure
of private information. 94
 According to the Court, an individual cannot
invoke Fifth Amendment protection based on the incriminating con-
tents of voluntarily prepared papers.95
 Rather, the Fifth Amendment
provides protection only when the act of producing the document
itself results in compelled communicative and incriminating testi-
mony.96
	8'5
	 Wilson, 221 U.S. at 379-80.
86 See id. at 380.
87
 Davis, 328 U.S. at 593.
88 M.
8"Couch, 409 U.S. at 327.
9"See id. at 336.
9] See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974).
92
 Fisher v, United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976).
	9:5
	 at 394.
94 Id. at 40!.
95 Id. at 409- 10,
96 Id. at 410- 11.
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Under an IRS investigation, the taxpayers in Fisher transferred
various tax-related documents prepared by their accountants to their
attorneys for advice in connection with the investigation."' Shortly
thereafter, the IRS issued a summons to the attorneys demanding the
documents."8 The attorneys refused to comply with the summons,
raising attorney-client privilege as well as their clients' Fifth Amend-
ment rights.""
The Court determined that the attorney-client privilege would
only protect the papers in the attorneys' possession if the Fifth Amend-
ment protected the papers in the taxpayers' possession.m° The Court
reasoned that the attorney-client privilege exists to encourage full
disclosure by clients to their attorneys during the course of legal rep-
resentation.m The Court further reasoned that, because the attorney-
client privilege effectively withholds information from the trier of fact,
the privilege can only apply when necessary to achieve its purpose of
full client disclosure. 102 According to the Court, the attorney-client
privilege only serves to protect those disclosures clients would not
make in the absence of protection.'" 3 The Court concluded that pre-
existing documents, obtainable by the Court from an individual, do
not become protected by the attorney-client privilege when the indi-
vidual transfers them to an attorney. ["`' Only if the taxpayers could
successfully invoke Fifth Amendment protection for the documents
when in their possession could their attorneys successfully invoke the
attorney-client privilege against the subpoena. "''
Although the Court conceded that prior opinions established a
broad Fifth Amendment protection of privacy, the Fisher opinion
stressed that the amendment only protects privacy within the parame-
ters of its more textually explicit purpose, preventing compelled, self-
incriminating testimony.'"" The Court noted that the Framers of the
Fifth Amendment sought not to achieve a general protection of pri-
vacy, but to prevent compelled self-incrimination. 1 °7 Noting that the
text of the Fifth Amendment does not mention the word privacy, the
97
 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394.
"Id. at 394.
" Id. at 395. In addition to their clients' Fifth Amendment defenses, the altorneys also raised
accountant-client privilege and Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
11
"' Id. at 405.
Im Id. at 403.
1 "Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
ins
1 "4 Id. at 403-04.
1 "5 Id. at 405.
11 ' 5 See id. at 399.
"Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400.
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Court inferred that the scope of any Fifth Amendment protection of
privacy derives solely from judicial construction of the amendment. 108
The Court concluded that the establishment of a broad protection of
privacy within the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment would divorce
the language of the amendment from its meaning.'''`'
In light of the language of the Fifth Amendment prohibiting
compelled self-incrimination, the Court asserted that not even per-
sonal privacy would prevent the use of otherwise properly acquired
evidence. 110
 The Court indicated that Fifth Amendment protection
extends to compelled disclosures of incriminating information, and
not to every disclosure of any private information."' The Court con-
cluded that any protection for private, non-compelled, self-incriminat-
ing information, such as voluntarily prepared documents, must stem
from other sources."'
The Court examined the Boyd holding that the Fifth Amendment
prevents the compelled production of documents."' The Court as-
serted that the foundations of the absolute protection against com-
pelled production of documents amounted to a rule searching for a
rationale.'" According to the Court, a subpoena requiring a person to
produce voluntarily prepared written records compels neither oral
testimony nor a restatement or affirmation of the truth of the contents
of the documents sought. 15
 The Court stressed that incriminating
testimony must be compelled in order to receive Fifth Amendment
protection."" Therefore, incriminating contents of voluntarily pre-
pared papers would not give rise to Fifth Amendment protection,
because those contents were not themselves compelled.'" The Court
concluded that the taxpayers in Fisher could not avoid compliance with
1°8 See id. at 401. Indeed, the Court explicitly declined to 'cut the Fifth Amendment corn-
pletely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of
privacy. ." Id.
1 °9 Id.
11° Id. at 399.
1 " Id, at 401.
112
 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401. The Court indicated that such protections may be found in
the Fourth Amendment's protection against overbroad subpoenas, or in the First Amendment.
Id. See also, Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents —Cutting Fisher!s 'Angled
Line, 49 Mo. L. Ret'. 439, 464 (1984) (author suggests First Amendment to protect document
contents).
113 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405.
114 1d, at 409.
115
 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 409-10.
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the subpoena merely by asserting that the papers sought contained
some incriminating content. 118
The Court outlined the scope of Fifth Amendment protection of
documents."' According to the Court, the Fifth Amendment offers
protection where the compelled act of producing documents results
in incriminating, testimonial corn munication. 12" The Court reasoned
that an act of producing a document may tacitly concede either the
existence or authentication of the papers, or possession by the person
compelled. 121 In any of those circumstances, the act of producing
documents results in a testimonial communication.'" The Court also
noted that the testimonial act of production may also be incriminat-
ing.'" The Court concluded that when the act of producing a docu-
ment results in a compelled, self-incriminating testimonial communi-
cation, the Fifth Amendment protects that act.'"
The Court cautioned, however, that where an individual, through
an act of production, adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
government's information, the act does not qualify as testimonia1. 125 In
Fisher, the taxpayers' act of producing the accountants' documents did
not rise to the level of testimony because the existence and possession
of the papers was a "foregone conclusion." 121' According to the Court,
the government did not rely on the act of production to prove exist-
ence, possession or control of the documents. 127
 Further, the taxpayers'
accountants prepared the documents, and therefore the taxpayers' act
of producing the papers could not authenticate them—only the ac-
countant could authenticate the compelled papers.'" Accordingly, the
act of production of the papers did not add to the sum total of the
government's case, and thus did not give rise to Fifth Amendment
protection.' 29
118 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
119 Id. at 410-11.
12° Id. at 410.
121 Id.
122 1d. at 410-11.
123/Asher 425 U.S. at 419-11.
124 See id.
125 Id. at. 41 1.
12.61d.
127 1d.
1211 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
129 See id. The Court offered another example of a testimonial act that would not implicate
the Fifth Amendment. Id. An accused required to submit a handwriting sample would admit an
ability to write, and authenticate his own handwriting sample. Id. The Court indicated, however,
that his ability to write would amount to a near truism, and thus, his authentication would be self'
evident. Id. Therefore, the act of producing the compelled evidence would not violate his Fifth
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Both Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred separately in the
Fisher decision.'" Although Justice Brennan concurred in the specific
judgment that the Fifth Amendment did not provide a protection for
the two taxpayers in Fisher, he expressed concern that the majority
failed to address the extent of any remaining Fifth Amendment, con-
tents-based protection for other, more personal clocuments.' 3 ' A his-
torical survey of the Fifth Amendment convinced Brennan that, at least
until the Court's opinion in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment did protect
the contents of personal records.'" In support of that conclusion,
Brennan relied on the protection of personal privacy, which he iden-
tified as a central purpose of the amendment.'" Brennan reasoned that
an individual's books and papers serve as an extension of that individ-
ual's mind, revealing no less than could be revealed upon direct ques-
tioning.'" As the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled disclo-
sure of the contents of one's mind, that protection must extend to the
contents of documents serving as extensions of one's mind.'" Brennan
concluded that Fifth Amendment analysis based on the act of produc-
ing a document ignores a recognized zone of privacy surrounding
certain materials.' 36
Although he did not set forth a specific standard to determine
which documents lie within the zone of privacy, Justice Brennan did
offer some guidelines.'" According to Brennan, the Fifth Amendment
zone of privacy should extend where one enjoys a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of a document.'" An individual estab-
lishes an expectation of privacy by keeping the documents private
rather than disclosing their contents to third parties.'" In addition to
that guideline, Brennan offered a broad standard of privacy, asserting
Amendment privilege because the act would not be sufficiently testimonial for the purposes of
the privilege. Id. Once the target of the subpoena establishes that compliance would result in
compelled, self-incriminating testimony, the government may rebut by showing that the act of
production adds little or nothing to its case. See Scott D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United States:
An Examination of a Custodian's Fifth Amendment Right to Avoid Personal Production of Corporate
&awls, '34 I. KEN,. 353, 373 (1989). Indeed, the government's ability to independently
authenticate may become the critical issue in many document subpoena cases. See Kenneth J.
Melilli, Act of Production Immunity, 52 011irr Sr. U. 223, 264 (1991).
19° Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring) and 430 (Marshall, J., concurring).
131 M at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
I 32 M. at 419-20.
1 " id. at 416.
134 Id. at 420.
151 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 420.
1145 See id. at 423.
177 .M. at 424.
sd Id.
15.9 1d. at 425.
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that documents containing a requisite element of privacy or confiden-
tiality merit Fifth Amendment protection. 14"
Justice Brennan conceded the impossibility of exhaustively listing
protected documents, although he did offer a partial list."" According
to Brennan, the Filth Amendment should protect the contents of
economic records in the possession of the individual, such as canceled
checks or tax records, or written records amounting to mental notes
of one's business affairs. 142 Such records merit Fifth Amendment pro-
tection, Brennan reasoned, because they either provide insights into a
person's total lifestyle, or they act as extensions of an aspect of a
person's activities.'" More clearly within the Fifth Amendment zone
of privacy, according to Brennan, fall personal letters and personal
diaries.'" Personal diaries, a fortiori, merit Fifth Amendment protec-
tion.'"
Justice Marshall's concurrence noted that despite an inherent
analytical imprecision, the Court's prior cases involving compelled
document production illustrate a deeply held belief in the privacy of
certain documents. 14t' He indicated, however, that the Court's new
focus of inquiry—the act of production—may afford the most com-
plete protection against compulsory production of private papers.' 47
Marshall reasoned that the existence of certain documents such as
corporate record books does not derive solely from the act of produc-
tion. 14" The existence of a personal diary, however, cannot generally be
established absent the production of that diary—a tacit admission of
existence by the target of the subpoena. 1 • The truly private nature of
a personal diary serves to ensure that third parties cannot generally
verify its existence.'" Marshall described an inverse relationship be-
tween the private nature of a document and the permissibility of
assuming its existence.' 5 ' The more personal and intimate the docu-
ment, the less likely third parties can assume the document's exist-
110 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425-26.
141 Id. at 426.
"2 1d. at 427.
145 Id. at 426-27. Justice Brennan recognized that business and economic records may lack
the expectation of privacy thund in other types of documents due to disclosure to third parties.
Id.
144 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 427.
145 Id.
145 See Id at 431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
147 See id. at 432.
148 See id. at 432.
149 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 432-33.
1110 See
151 1d. at 433.
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ence. 152 The establishment of a truly intimate and personal document
could not be assumed because it is not inherently private.'" Conversely,
the existence of a corporate record book could nearly always be as-
sumed.'"
Marshall also discussed how an incriminating act of production
could serve to protect personal papers.'" According to Marshall, al-
though maintaining a diary may not be incriminating, the Fifth Amend-
ment would protect that diary to the extent of a "real danger" that the
diary led to incriminating evidence.' 55 Marshall concluded that the
majority merely supplanted an ad hoc analysis with a technical one,
and that a de facto protection of privacy would result from the lower
courts' application of that standard. 157
Thus, in Fisherthe Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment
will not protect the contents of certain tax records.'" According to the
Court, only when the act of producing a document in response to a
subpoena amounts to an incriminating testimonial communication
will the Fifth Amendment protect an individual from compulsion to
perform that act.'" The Court, however, explicitly declined to deter-
mine whether the Fifth Amendment would shield personal documents
rather than documents prepared by accountants on behalf of tax-
payers. "4'
In 1984, in United States v. Doe, the Court applied the act of
production analysis detailed in Fisher to hold that the Fifth Amend-
ment offers no protection for the contents of a sole proprietor's busi-
ness records. 15 ' The Court reversed the findings of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the Fifth Amendment
protected the sole proprietor's records because of their personal na-
ture.' 62 The Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's contents-based
analysis, asserting that the Fifth Amendment protection extends only
to compelled self-incrimination.' 63 The Court declined to reverse dis-
trict court findings, however, and therefore affirmed that the sole
192 Id.
163 .M. at 432-33,
154 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 432-33.
155 See id. at 433.
155 See id at 433.
157 Id. at 434.
158 See id. at 414.
159 See. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
16° 1d. at 414,
161 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606, 617 (1984).
112 Id. at 609.
163 Id. at 610.
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proprietor's act of production resulted in an incriminating, testimonial
communication sufficient to invoke Fifth Amendment protection.'"
In conjunction with an investigation into corrupt county and
municipal contract awards, a grand jury subpoenaed a variety of re-
cords from Doe, a sole proprietor.' 65 The grand jury sought, inter alia,
ledgers, journals, paid bills, invoices, tax returns and several other
categories of documents relating to business activity.'" The district
court inquired solely into the nature of the act of production.""/ Ac-
cording to the district court, production of the documents would
compel the sole proprietor to admit lie possessed the documents and
they existed, and to authenticate the documents. 16" The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court, adding that a sole proprietor acts in a
personal capacity, and thus creates personal documents privileged un-
der the Fifth Amendment.'"
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the sole proprietor argued that
under Boyd, his papers fell within a Fifth Amendment zone of privacy.'"
The Court, however, characterized the business records at issue in Doe
as even less personal than the tax documents in Fisher that did not
merit Fifth Amendment protection."' Rather than focus on the con-
tents of the documents, however, the Court stressed that the sole
proprietor created them voluntarily, and not under compulsion.' 72 Be-
cause the sole proprietor prepared the documents voluntarily, without
compulsion, the subpoena would not force him to restate, repeat or
affirm the truth of their contents."' The Court concluded that volun-
tarily prepared documents lack the compulsion necessary to trigger
Fifth Amendment protection, although the Court held that the act of
production doctrine protected the documents.'"
164 14. at 615-14.
165 /d. at 606.
166 Doe, 465 U.S. at 605 n.I.
167 In re Grand jury Empatieled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Stipp. 1, 3 (1).N.J. 1981).
1681d .
1 '19 See In re Grand jury Ettipatieled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 330, 338 (3d Cir. 1982).
17° Doe, 465 U.S. at 610 n.7.
171 Id.
112 Id. at 610.
113 Id, at 611-12. The Court also examined the act of producing the documents, holding that
the record could support the district court's explicit findings of l'act that the act of production
involved compelled testimonial self-incrimination. See id. at 613-14.
174 See id. at 610, 613-14. See also Baltimore Dep't. of Social Scrv. v. liouknight, 493 U.S. 549
(1990). The Bouknight case involved the compelled production of a child. M. al 551. In dicta,
the Court indicated that a person may not claim Fifth Amendment protection based on the
incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the thing demanded. Id. at 555.
Instead, according to the Court, a person may claim Fifth Amendment protection when the act.
982	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:965
Illustrating the tension on the Court surrounding the extent, if
any, of a Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of any personal
papers, Justices O'Connor and Marshall issued separate concurrences
to clarify the issue.' 75 Justice O'Connor briefly but firmly concluded
that although the majority did not explicitly conclude that the Fifth
Amendment offers no protection for personal papers, the reasoning
of the majority opinion implied such a conclusion."" Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, however, argued that no person ought to
be compelled to produce certain types of documents due to their
intrinsically personal nature.'"
B. Griswold: The General Zone of Privacy
In addition to the limited Fifth Amendment protection of privacy
described in Fisher and Doe, the Supreme Court identified a broad
protection of privacy in the 1965 case, Griswold v. Connectieta.' 78 In
Griswold the Court held that the right to privacy, emanating from
penumbras of the Fifth and several other amendments, guaranteed
married couples unhindered access to contraceptives."' In his Fisher
concurrence, Justice Brennan cited Griswold, among other cases, as
support for his assertion that the Fifth Amendment creates a zone of
privacy that surrounds the contents of certain intimately personal docu-
ments.' 8°Additionally, at least one lower court as well as a commentator
have based Fifth Amendment protection of personal documents in
part on Griswold."'
Griswold involved a challenge to a Connecticut law establishing
criminal fines and sanctions against anyone who used or sold contra-
ceptives.'" In striking down the law, the Court reasoned that penum-
bras of several amendments, including the Fifth Amendment, create a
zone of privacy.'" A marital relationship, according to the Court, falls
within that zone.' 84 The Court concluded that a law attempting to
of complying with a subpoena testifies to the existence, possession or authentication of the thing
produced. Id.
175 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
176 Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171 M at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring).
178 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965),
L79 M at 485-86.
thij Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976).
181 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1980); Joyce B.
LaVacca, Protecting the Contents of a Personal Diary From Unwanted Eyes, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 389,
415-17 (1988).
182 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
185 Id. at 485.
184 Id.
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regulate an intimate aspect of that relationship violated the penumbral
right to privacy. 185
The statute at issue in Griswold sanctioned fines and imprisonment
for anyone convicted of using or assisting or abetting the use of con-
traception. 18 'S Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parent-
hood League of Connecticut, and Buxton, the medical director of the
League, regularly provided information, instruction and advice about
contraception to married couples in contravention of the statute. 187
Buxton and Griswold appealed their conviction and $100 fine to the
Supreme Court.'"
The Court, trying to avoid pure substantive due process analysis,
sought textual support for a right to privacy.'" The Court identified
penumbral rights of repose emanating from the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments.'" The Court reasoned that these amend-
ments create a zone of privacy within which the marital relationship
resides)" The Court concluded that regulation of an intimate realm
of the marital relationship violates the notions of privacy surrounding
that relationship.' 92 Thus, the Connecticut law violated a constitutional
right to privacy.' 9'
The Court identified the Fifth Amendment as one source of the
penumbral right to privacy.'" Citing Boyd's broad, privacy-based pro-
tection of documents, the Court indicated that the Fifth Amendment,
in conjunction with the Fourth, protects against all governmental in-
vasions of the sanctity of a person's home and the privacies of life.' 95
The Court traced this Fifth Amendment protection back to Boyd's
concern for the invasion of one's indefeasible right to personal secu-
rity, personal liberty and private property.'" The Court concluded that
the Fifth Amendment creates a distinct zone of privacy, which in
connection with the other listed amendments combine to form a
185 1d.
18(1 1d. at 480.
017 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
188 Id.
1119 See id, at 481-82. The Court continued to repudiate substantive due process, and thus in
order to justify the decision as one mandated by text, the CAmrt created a right to privacy out of
penumbras arid emanations of various amendments. JotiN E. Nownx & Rowti.n D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW 760 (4th e.(1. 1991).
1 " Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
'y' Id. at 485.
195 See id.
195 See id. at 485-86.
194 1d. at 484.
1 " Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
196 1d. at 484 n.* (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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fundamental, constitutional right of privacy violated by the Connecti-
cut statute, 197
In the wake of Fisher and Doe, courts may turn to the Griswold zone
of privacy to protect the contents of documents. 1 " justice Brennan, in
his Fisher concurrence, construed the Fifth Amendment as a broad
protector of privacy, citing Giiswo/ds construction of the Fifth Amend-
ment for support.''' Additionally, at least one post-Fisher circuit court
opinion relied in part on Griswold to support a broad Fifth Amend-
ment policy of protecting privacy.m Thus, the Griswold right to privacy,
based on penumbras emanating from the Fifth and other amend-
ments, may provide an arguable alternative protection for the contents
of personal documents. 20 '
II. THE CIRCUITS, POST-FISHER AND DOE
By declining to explicitly overturn Boyd, neither Fisher nor Doe
explicitly foreclose the possibility of a remaining limited contents-
based Fifth Amendment protection for certain types of personal docu-
men ts. 2"2
 Accordingly, circuit court opinions since Fisher and Doe have
split on the issue of whether Fifth Amendment protection, in any
circumstances, extends beyond the act of production to the contents
of any documents.205
 The most recent circuit opinions, including one
in late 1993, applied the act of production analysis to documents
197
 See id. at 484-86; see also In reGrand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1980)
(citing Griswold, Third Circuit recognizes Fifth Amendment right to privacy).
1914 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 916 (1976) (Brennan cites Griswold to
support Filth Amendment protection of privacy); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033,
1043 (3d Cir. 1980) (Third Circuit relies on Griswold to support Fifth Amendment protection of
privacy idler Doe); LaVacca, supra note 181, at 415-17 (commentator asserts that Griswold right
10 privacy should protect contents of personal diaries).
199
 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 416.
2110 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally infra
notes 263-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Circuit case.
291 See .supra note 198.
202 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988) (Court notes that Doe neither
announced a universal test to determine the scope of the privilege, nor established a more narrow
boundary applicable to acts alone) (not same case as United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)
discussed elsewhere); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618-19 (1984) (justices O'Connor and
Marshall differ over the extent of Boyd's survival); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Court declines to
determine whether Fifth Amendment protects personal documents).
205
 The Ninth, Fourth, Second and District of Columbia Circuits do not recognize a Fifth
Amendment contents-based protection for any documents. See In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum, 1
F,3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub. nom.John Doe v. United States, No. 93-523, 1994 U.S.
LEX IS 1170, at *1 (Jan. 24, 1994); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir. 1991),
appeal after remand, United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992); In re. Sealed Case, 877
F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub. nom. Roe v. United States, 493 U.S, 1044 (1990); In
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irrespective of their personal nature:2m Several other circuits remain
deliberately undecided on the issue, indicating that any contents-based
protection remaining after Fisher and Doe enjoys an extremely limited
scope. 20 Still other circuits continue to recognize a limited but impene-
trable zone of privacy around certain intimate, personal documents. 206
A. No Contents-Based Fifth Amendment Protection
In -1985, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings On February 4, 1982, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Fifth
Amendment does not protect the contents of any voluntarily prepared
documents. 2°7
 The case involved a subpoena for personal documents
in conjunction with an investigation of possible tax violations. 20' Rely-
ing on Fisher, the court indicated that absent a showing of compelled
creation of a document, no paper would enjoy contents-based Fifth
Amendment protection.2"gThe court concluded that the appellant had
not created the documents under compulsion, and therefore could
not invoke Fifth Amendment protection.21 "
In 1991, in United States v. Wujkowski, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that no broad, contents-
based Fifth Amendment privilege exists for any documents. 211
re Grand jury Proceedings On February 4, 1982, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985). The First,
Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh circuits remain deliberately undecided. See In re. Grand Jury
Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416
(8th Cir.), cert. denied sub. mom. Napieralski v. United States, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); In re. Jeffrey
Steinberg, 837 E2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. McCollum, 815 E2d 1087, 1090 (7th
Cir. 1987). Finally, the Third, Filth and Sixth circuits continue to recognize a contents-based
protection for personal documents. See Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Ur), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 862 (1981); In re Grand jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980).
204 See, e.g., Duces Tecum, 1 F.Sd at 92
-93.
2°5 See Grand Jury Investigation, 921 E2d at 1187 ii.6; Mason, 869 F.2d at 416; Steinberg, 837
F.2d at 530; McCollum, 815 F.2d at 1090.
206 See Butcher v, Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985); Davis, 636 F.24 at 1043; Grand
fury Proceedings, 632 E2d at 1044.
257 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings On February 4, 1982, 759 F,24 1418, 1419 (9th Cir.
1985), In United States v. MacKey, the Ninth Circuit recognized a Fifth Amendment, contents-
based protection for personal documents. See (147 F.2d 898, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the
decision in February 4 represents a post-Doe shirt in Ninth Circuit analysis.
"February 4, 759 F.2d at 1418-19.
209 M. at 1419.
210 Id. at 1420. The Ninth Circuit, noting the personal stature of some or the documents
requested, indicated that the act or production of the document may have testimonial aspects.
See id. at 1421. Accordingly, the court. remanded the case back to the district court for a
determination or whether the Filth Amendment protected the act of production. Id. See also In
re Sealed' Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (D.C. Circuit notes that Fifth Amendment does
not protect the contents of any voluntarily prepared papers, including personal ones).
211 United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Wujkowski involved a subpoena for various personal documents, includ-
ing desk and pocket calendars, appointment books, planner schedules
and daily meeting logs, pursuant to a Department of Energy investiga-
tion of one of its con tractors." 2 Relying on Fisher, the court noted that
with respect to voluntarily prepared documents, a subpoena compels
no more than the act of producing the document. 2 " The court then
remanded the case back to the district court for a determination of
whether the act of production of the subpoenaed documents con-
tained self incriminatory, testimonial elements. 2 "
In 1993, in In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 7ecum, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Fifth
Amendment does not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared
documents. 215
 Duces Thrum involved a subpoena issued pursuant to a
Securities and Exchange Comission investigation. 216
 The subpoena de-
manded various documents including a daily calendar, which the dis-
trict court judge characterized as an intimate, personal document. 217
In its opinion, the most recent circuit pronouncement on the issue to
date, the Second Circuit, citing three reasons, unequivocally disagreed
with the appellant's assertion that the Fifth Amendment protects the
contents of any non-business document. 218
 First, the court noted that
Boyd concerned business documents, rendering the opinion dicta with
respect to personal papers. 2 " Second, according to the court, Fisher
and Doe, in which the Supreme Court refused to extend contents-based
Fifth Amendment protection to certain documents, indicate that pro-
per Fifth Amendment document analysis now lies in the act of produc-
tion and not the contents of the document compelled. 22° Finally, the
212 Id. at 982 .
213
 Id. at 983.
214 See id. at 986. On remand, in United States v. Stone, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that despite the personal nature of the documents, the act of producing them
did not involve self-incriminating testimony. 976 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir. 1992). The court consid-
ered the existence, possession and authentication of the documents a foregone conclusion, and
thus the documents contributed little or nothing to the sum total of the government's informa-
tion. Id.
215 In re Grand jury Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993).
210
 Id, at 88.
217 1d. at 90 n.l.
218 Id. at 92. The decision in this case marks a shift in Second Circuit opinion regarding the
Fifth Amendment and the contents of documents. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated April 23, 1981, 657 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (Second Circuit recognizes contents-based
protection for personal papers).
219
 Duas Thom, 1 F.3d at 92. The Second Circuit indicated that dicta may be respected but
ought not control the judgment in a subsequent suit in which the dicta is on point. Id. at 92-93.
22°M at 92.
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court interpreted opinions from the Fourth, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits as establishing that under modern Fifth Amend-
ment analysis, voluntarily prepared documents enjoy no Fifth Amend-
ment protection."'
In 1994, in Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Senator Bob Packwood,
the most recent federal opinion on the issue, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia denied Fifth Amendment protection
to the contents of documents. 222 In Packwood, the Ethics Committee
sought to enforce a subpoena for the extensive diaries of United States
Senator Bob Packwood as part of an investigation into sexual miscon-
duct. 225 The D.C. District Court interpreted Fisher and Doe as repudiat-
ing the Boyd protection of personal documents. 224 The court concluded
that although the Fifth Amendment protects incriminating, testimo-
nial acts of production, it provides no protection for the contents of
voluntarily created documents. 225
In late 1992, the Senate Ethics Committee began an investigation
into widely publicized allegations of Senator Packwood's sexual mis-
conduct, intimidation and misuse of staff. 226 Following a deposition at
which Packwood referred to the diaries in defense to committee ques-
tioning, the committee issued a subpoena for the diaries in October
of 1993. 227 After negotiations, the committee and Packwood agreed that
the committee could examine the diaries in the presence of Pack-
wood's counsel, after Packwood masked those entries relating either
to attorney-client or doctor-patient privilege, or containing highly per-
sonal, family materia1. 228 The committee staff, in the presence of Pack-
wood's counsel, could mark pages containing material relevant to its
221 Id. at 93. The court. then concluded that the act of production of the diary required mere
surrender of the calendar and not testimony. Id. Thus, appellant could claim no Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. Id. at 94. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Altimari noted that the Supreme Court
never explicitly overruled Boyd, and therefore the dicta in Boyd describing Fifth Amendment
protection of documents controlled this case. Id. at 95. Altimari also disagreed with the majority
that the other circuits cited actually agreed with the majority, and then cited several other circuit
opinions supporting a Boyd argument. See id. at 96. On January 24, 1994, nine Justices on the
Supreme Court agreed to deny certiorari to Duces Tecum. See Doe v. United States, No. 93-523,
1994 U.S. LEXIS 1170, at *1 (jam 24, 1994).
222 See Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Senator Bob Packwood, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
472, at *20 (D.C. Dist. Jan. 24, 1994).
223 Id. at *1.
224 Id. at *19.
225 Id.
228 id at *2 .
227 Packwood, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *3.
228 Id. at *4.
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investigation which Packwood would then reproduce and deliver to the
committee. 229
During the examination process, the committee discovered and
marked material pertaining to additional possible ethics and criminal
violations. 259 Packwood then suspended his agreement with the com-
mittee."' On October 20, 1993, the Senate Ethics Committee voted
unanimously to issue a subpoena for the diaries, and on October 21,
voted unanimously to report a resolution to enforce the subpoena to
the full Senate for debate and a vote."2 On November 2, 1993, the full
Senate, by a vote of 94-6, adopted the resolution, and thus authorized
the committee to seek enforcement of the subpoena in federal court. 733
The D.C. District court dispensed with Senator Packwood's Fifth
Amendment claim in one paragraph. 2" The court first examined Boyd,
noting that even Senator Packwood conceded the erosion of the Boyd
holding.235 Turning to Fisher and Doe, the district court reasoned that
the Fifth Amendment protection now extends only to incriminating,
testimonial acts of production, and not to the contents of voluntarily
prepared, and thus non-compelled, personal documents. 236 Accord-
ingly, the district court held that the Fifth Amendment did not provide
protection for the contents of Senator Packwood's personal diaries."'
Packwood applied to the Supreme Court for a stay pending his appeal
of the district court order.238 On March 2, 1994, the Supreme Court
denied Senator Packwood's application. 239
Most recent circuit opinions reflect a trend repudiating the broad,
contents-based Fifth Amendment document protection enunciated in
Boyd.24" Those circuits interpret Fisher and Doe, in which the Court
229 Id.
2-3" Id. at *5.
231 Id. at *6.
252 Packwood, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *6.
233 Id. at *8; see also 139 CONG. REC. S14,725 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) through 139 Com:. REC.
S14,832 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1993) (complete record of Senate debate and vote on subpoena
enforcement).
234 Packwood, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *17-18.
235 id.
256 Id. at *19; see also In the Matter of Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. III. 1989) (no
protection for contents of any voluntarily prepared documents); United States v. Cates, 686 F.
Supp. 1185, 1190 (D. Md. 1988) (inherent in Fisher and Due is proposition that Fifth Amendment
does not protect contents of any documents).
297
	 Packwood, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *17.
238 See Bob Packwood, Applicant v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, No. A-704, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 2044, at *1 (Mar. 2, 1994).
239 See id. at *5. The Court relied on its denial of certiorari in the Second Circuit case, Duces
Tecum, to conclude that four justices would not vote to review the issue. See id.; see also supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
24° See In re Grand jury Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
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limited Fifth Amendment protection to the act of production of docu-
ments, as indicating that the Fifth Amendment no longer protects the
contents of any voluntarily prepared document."' In several circuits,
therefore, personal diaries not protected by an incriminating, testimo-
nial act of production receive no contents-based Fifth Amendment
protection. 242
B. Deliberately Undecided
Several additional circuits that have not clearly repudiated a con-
tents-based Fifth Amendment protection in the wake of Fisher and Doe
remain explicitly undecided."' In 1988, in In re Jeffrey Steinberg, for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
expressly declined to decide whether the Fifth Amendment provides
any protection for the contents of personal documents. 244 Steinberg
involved a grand jury investigation into fraud in fund raising activities
on behalf of then presidential candidate Lyndon Larouche."' In re-
sponse to the grand jury subpoena for certain notebooks containing
information about the Larouche campaign fund raising activities, Jef-
frey Steinberg sought Fifth Amendment protection based on incrimi-
nating contents of the notebooks."' The First Circuit noted that no
other justices joined O'Connor's concurrence in Doe asserting that the
Fifth Amendment no longer protects the contents of any documents. 247
The court reasoned, however, that Fisher and Doe indicate that the
contents-based protection established in Boyd enjoys, at best, extremely
limited application."' The First Circuit then noted that Steinberg pre-
sented no evidence to rebut the government's assertions that the
notebooks at issue pertained to the Larouche campaign organization,
and lacked any intimate or personal character. 249 Thus, the court con-
Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings On February 4, 1982, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).
241 See id.
242 See id.
243 See In reGrand Jury lnvestigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991) (absent explicit
overturn of Boyd and government's failure to pursue issue, question remains open); United States
v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989) (no need to determine whether Fifth Amendment
protects documents' contents given district court's reasonable finding that documents are non-
persona]); In re Jeffrey Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988) (whether contents protected
explicitly left undecided); United States v. McCollum, 815 F,2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1987) (no
need to decide question of Boyd protection where documents not prepared under compulsion).
244 Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530.
245 1d. at 527.
246 Id. at 528.
247 1d. at 530.
2411
242 Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530.
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eluded, even if any shred of Boyd remained, a matter that the court
declined to decide, the protection would not extend to the type of
documents at issue. 25°
Similarly, in the 1989 case, United States v. Mason, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit deliberately declined
to decide whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of any
documents.251
 Mason involved an investigation of marijuana cultivation
and trafficking pursuant to which law enforcement officials searched
and seized, among other items, several "pocket day timers" detailing
the marijuana cultivation operation.'" The Eighth Circuit accepted the
district court's characterization of the documents as non-personal. 253
The court then noted the erosion of the broad, Boyd contents-based
protection, reasoning that even if the Fifth Amendment protects the
contents of certain personal documents, the court would only extend
such protection where compelled production would "break the heart
of our sense of privacy."254 The Eighth Circuit, however, expressly de-
clined to determine whether the Fifth Amendment protects the con-
tents of any documents in the absence of findings that the day timers
contained highly personal material. 255
In 1991, in In re Grand Jury Investigation, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit similarly declined to determine the
extent, if any, of a Fifth Amendment, contents-based protection of
documents. 256 Grand Jury Investigation, involved subpoenas to an attor-
ney for several documents relating to an investigation for money laun-
dering and tax fraud. 257 The Eleventh Circuit noted that although some
circuits deny any Fifth Amendment protection to the contents of docu-
ments, the issue remained undecided in the Eleventh Circuit. 258 Citing
the Supreme Court's reluctance to explicitly overrule Boyd, as well as
the government's failure to press the point, the court opted to leave
the question open in the Eleventh Circuit. 25°
The majority of circuits examining the extent of a Fifth Amend-
ment protection for documents most recently have either concluded
255 Id.
251 United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989).
152 Id. at 415-16.
253 /d. at 416.
254 Id. (citing justice Marshall's concurrence in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 n.2
(1984)).
255 1d. at 416.
256 See In re Grand jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991).
257 Id. at 1185.
258 /d. at 1187 n.6,
2551d.
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that no such protection exists, or that the Boyd contents-based protec-
tion at most provides protection only in extreme cases apparently not
faced by those courts. 26° Part of the indecision in some circuits stems
from the Supreme Court's reluctance to overrule Boyd. 261 In addition,
however, many of the undecided circuits recognize that Fisher and Doe
have substantially weakened and possibly eliminated, the Boyd con-
tents-based protection. 2"2
C. Privacy - Based Fifth Amendment Protection
In contrast, some circuits still hold that a Boyd contents-based Fifth
Amendment protection continues to shield personal documents from
compelled production. 263 In 1980, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
(hereinafter 'Johanson") the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment protects an individual
from compelled production of self-incriminating private papers. 264 Jo-
hanson involved a grand jury subpoena for notes, memoranda, ap-
pointment books and other documents of a target of the Abscam
investigation. 265 The court asserted that the Fisher language that the
Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination and
not disclosure of private information, in no way contradicts protection
of private papers. 26"The court cited prior cases in which the Supreme
Court announced a Fifth Amendment policy of protecting privacy, and
interpreted the historical origins of the Fifth Amendment as protecting
the privacy of personal papers. 267 The court noted that Johanson cre-
ated and personally maintained all of the documents at issue, and
concluded that he established a rightful expectation of privacy that
merited Fifth Amendment protection
26° See supra notes 202-6'2 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d at 1187 n.6.
262 See, e.g., Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 528-29.
265 .See Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d
1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1044 (3d Cir. 1980)
(hereinafter "Johanson").
264 632 F.2d at 1042.
265 /d. at 1037 n.7.
266 Id. at 1042.
267 Id. at 1042-93. Among other policies underlying the protection of personal papers, the
court cited respect for the inviolability of the human personality and the right of each individual
to a private enclave where he may lead a private life (citing, inter alio, Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)), as well
as the chilling effect on thought and expression that the absence of a Fifth Amendment protec-
tion could cause. See id. at. 1043.
2°6 Id. at 1044. Although Johanson pre-dates Doe, it remains good law to the extent that Doe
declined to overrule Boyd, and that no subsequent Third Circuit opinion has overruled/At/won.
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In 1981, in United States v. Davis, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that under Boyd, the Fifth Amend-
ment protects any incriminating papers in the actual or constructive
possession of an individual." In Davis, the Internal Revenue Service
issued a summons for records of financial transactions and other
documents relating to an investigation of tax fraud. 27° The court read
Boyd and Fisher as creating two basic frameworks for Fifth Amendment
analysis. 27 ' The Fifth Circuit recognized the Fisher protection based on
the act of production. 272 The court also recognized, however, a Boyd
protection, which it construed as creating a zone of privacy around
personal documents in the hands of the owner. 273 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that documents created, held and maintained by an individ-
ual in an individual capacity, fall within the Boyd zone of privacy. 274 The
Fifth Circuit remanded the case for proceedings to identify the purely
private documents meriting Fifth Amendment protection. 275
In 1985, in Butcher v. Bailey, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit stated that Fisher and Doe do not indicate that the
Fifth Amendment may never protect the contents of private papers. 276
The dispute in Butcher arose out of a Chapter VII bankruptcy proceed-
ing in which the statute required Butcher to turn over any records
relating to the property of the bankruptcy estate. 277 The Sixth Circuit
denied Butcher's Fifth Amendment claim after determining that the
records at issue lacked the intimately personal nature necessary to
invoke privacy concerns. 278 The court recognized that although Fisher
and Doe limit the extent of a Fifth Amendment, contents-based protec-
tion, neither case eradicated such protection for private papers. 279
According to the Sixth Circuit, in rare situations "where compelled
disclosure would 'break the heart of our sense of privacy,'" the Fifth
Amendment would protect the contents of a private document. 28° The
269 United States v Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981). LikeJohanson, supra note 268,
Davis also pre-dates Doe, but continues to control in the Fifth Circuit.
279 Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service sought to determine
whether certain people engaged in drug trafficking had paid taxes on their drug-related income.
Id.
271 Id. at 1041.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1042.
274 Davis, 636 F.2d at 1043.
275 Id. at 1044.
276 Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (Gth Cir. 1985).
277 Id. at 466.
2713 Id. at 469.
279 See id.
2919 See id. (citing Justice Marshall's concurrence in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619
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court then analyzed the contents of the documents, noting that they
pertained solely to the property of the bankrupt's estate." The Sixth
Circuit concluded that information relating to property of the bank-
ruptcy estate lacks the intimate, personal nature necessary to evoke
concern over privacy interests. 282
Despite the recent trend among the circuits repudiating Boyd's
contents-based Fifth Amendment protection for personal papers, some
circuits continue to extend the Fifth Amendment to the contents of
personal documents. While many of these circuits incorporate the
litho-act of production analysis into their examination of Fifth Amend-
ment issues, they do not necessarily supplant the Boyd contents-based
analysis with the newer Fisher analysis.'" Rather, they use the Fisher act
of production analysis as an extension of the Boyd analysis."' As long
as the Supreme Court continues to forego opportunities to clarify this
area of Fifth Amendment law, the tremendously varying circuit ap-
proaches will likely continue. 285
Ill. PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF PERSONAL DIARIES
A. Current Status of Fifth Amendment .Protection of Diaries
The current status of any explicit Fifth Amendment protection for
diaries varies to a large extent with the circuit of venue. 286 The trend
in modern Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, however, edges away from
a privacy-founded, contents-based Fifth Amendment protection for
diaries, and toward a focus on the implications of the act of producing
those diaries. 281 Although some lower courts will continue to recognize
a contents-based Fifth Amendment protection for certain personal
diaries, Fisher and Doe raise serious questions about the continuing
viability of a privacy based Fifth Amendment analysis. 288
n.2 (1984)). The court then recognized that the act of production limy also involve sell-incrimi-
nating testimony, and thus could provide another avenue for Fifth Amendment protection. See
Blacker; 753 F.2d at 469. Although the court concluded the act of production did involve a
testimonial communication through authentication, the court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of the incriminating nature of that testimonial communication. M. at 469-70.
281 Butcher, 753 E2d at 469.
252 a
283 See .supra notes 263-85 and accompanying text.
284 See, e.g., Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469; Davis, 636 F.2d at 1041.
285 See supra notes 202-82 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 202-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varying ways circuit
courts of appeals treat personal papers.
287 See ,supra note 260-62 and accompanying text.
288 see. e.g., Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bottknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990). The
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The protection of privacy within the Fifth Amendment derives
from the Supreme Court, and displays vulnerability to redefinition and
refinement. In Fisher, for example, the Court examined the text of the
Fifth Amendment to determine that the amendment does not serve as
a general protector of privacy. 289 Yet in opinions prior to Fisher, the
Court frequently recognized a broad, general Fifth Amendment pro-
tection of privacy.29° The scope of that right varied from a broad
protection for the contents of any personal documents, to an even
broader general protection of marital privacy.29 ' The protection of
privacy element of the Fifth Amendment, therefore, appears malleable
and unstable, leading to the conclusion that the protection enjoys a
scope neither more expansive nor limited than the Court's most recent
statement. The Fisher and Doe revisions of the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection of privacy, therefore, most likely limit that protection to the act
of production and not to the contents of personal documents such as
diaries.
The Doe opinion further clarified the limited extent to which the
Fifth Amendment protects privacy, by applying the Fisher analysis in
the context, arguably, of more personal documents. 292 The contents of
the documents at issue in Doe reflect non-personal, business concerns,
whereas the contents of the Fisher documents contain personal tax
information of two individuals. 2" In Doe, however, an individual in an
individual capacity created and kept the documents, whereas in Fisher,
an accountant prepared and kept the documents.294 The documents at
issue in Doe, therefore, entirely personal to the sole proprietor and
disclosed to no third parties, seem more personal than those in Fisher,
despite their business nature. 2"5 Thus, Doe reiterated Fisher's limited
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the most recent case on the issue, cited
Boulinight as an indication that the Fifth Amendment no longer protects the contents of anything,
including personal documents. See In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum, I F.3d 87, 93 (2c1 Cir. 1993).
289 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976).
291 ' See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
'291 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (contents-based protection
for all personal documents); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (penumbras
of the Fifth and other amendments create a zone of privacy preventing state restriction of marital
relationship).
292 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.7 (1984).
293 See id. The documents at issue in Doe, though personal to the sole proprietor, pertained
to his business dealings. Id. at 607. The documents in Fisher pertained to personal tax records,
but were created by the taxpayers' accountants and in the possession of their attorneys. See Fisher,
425 U.S. at 394.
291 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610 n.7.
299 But see Doe, 465 U.S. at 610 n.7. The Doe Court noted that the Fisher documents related
to the taxpayers' personal taxes, whereas the Doe documents related to the sole proprietor's
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construction of the privacy interest within the Fifth Amendment, in
the context of documents of a greater personal nature than Fisher. 29'
Consistent with Fisher and Doe, the more recent opinions in the
lower courts recognize the shift in Fifth Amendment analysis from
privacy based on the contents of the documents, to the act of produc-
ing the compelled documents. 297 Some circuits have contravened prior
circuit precedent to recognize the Supreme Court's shift in analysis. 298
The Ninth Circuit, for example, which in 1981 implicitly recognized a
limited contents-based protection, firmly held in 1985 that after Doe,
the Fifth Amendment no longer protected the contents of voluntarily
created papers. 299 The Second Circuit, in the most recent circuit court
opinion on the issue, also repudiated its former recognition of a
contents-based protectio n."9
Several additional circuits, in recognition of the weakness of Boyd
as well as the fact that the Supreme Court has not overruled Boyd,
decline to rule either way on the issue."' These opinions generally
recognize the Court's limitation of the once broad Boyd protection."2
In light of that limitation, undecided circuits conclude that if any
aspect of a contents-based protection remains, it extends only to the
most intimately personal documents, none of which have apparently
been at issue."' Although Fisher and Doe do not explicitly preclude a
privacy, contents-based Fifth Amendment protection for purely per-
sonal documents, the two opinions, in combination with the more
recent lower court opinions, raise strong doubts about the continued
viability of that protection.
Finally, the Second and Ninth Circuits' post-Doe shift from a con-
tents-based analysis to an act of production analysis may shed light on
business, Id. Therefbre, the Doe Court concluded that in scone respects, the Fisher documents
were more personal than the Doe documents. Id.
296 The Court's recent denial of certiorari in the Second Circuit case, In re Duces Tecurn, and
denial of Senator Packwood's application for a stay pending appeal may further indicate that the
Court deems the issue settled in favor of Fisher and Doe, and against Boyd, particularly because
the disputed lower court opinions in both instances denied contents-based Fifth Amendment
protection.
297 See supra notes 202-42 and accompanying text.
2" Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have shifted their Fifth Amendment analysis in light
of Fisher and Doe. See supra notes 268-69.
'499 See supra note 2613.
300 See supra note 269.
391 See supra notes 243-62 and accompanying text.
302 See id.
303 See id. In fairness, it is entirely possible that faced with a subpoena for a document as
intimately personal as a private diary, many of the undecided circuits would extend a contents-
based protection.
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those circuits that still recognize a contents-based protection. The
decisions in many of the circuits recognizing a contents-based protec-
tion pre-date Doe.304 Thus, the recognition of a contents-based protec-
tion in some circuits may stem more from the absence of a case
revisiting the issue than from a steadfast urge to extend Fifth Amend-
ment protection to the contents of personal documents.
B. The Alternative Rights to Privacy as Protection. for Personal Diaries
The suggestion of an enforceable subpoena for personal diaries
evokes a strong reaction from diary keepers who wish to preserve the
inviolable sanctity of their private musings." 5 Diary writers relying on
an imputed Fifth Amendment protection of privacy, however, risk
continual redefinition, or even eradication of that protection. Ulti-
mately, the varying scope of an imputed Fifth Amendment protection
of privacy renders that protection inadequate for the contents of inti-
mately personal writings.
1. Practical Problems With a Fifth Amendment Protection of Privacy
In practical terms, a Fifth Amendment protection of privacy pre-
sents several problems. The application of the protection of a right to
privacy to truly intimate, personal papers requires either a definition
of the protected papers, or a standard that courts can apply to deter-
mine in each case which papers merit protection. Yet creating such a
list may prove an insurmountable task."' According to Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Fisher, for example, only certain economic and
business records which function as an extension of an aspect of a
person's activities merit protection."' Similarly, non-business economic
records in the possession of an individual, such as canceled checks,
may merit protection because they provide insight into a person's total
lifestyles, or may not merit protection due to disclosure to third parties,
and thus a reduced expectation of privacy."' According to Brennan,
personal letters, although disclosed to third parties, definitely merit
protection because of their peculiarly private nature."' As Justice Bren-
" See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980).
"5 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Private! Keep Out.' Our Diaries —Even Sen. Bab Paekwood's—Are
Nobotlys Business But Our Own, USA Tomy, Dec. 2, 1993, at 13A.
3°6 See Fisher v. United Stales, 425 U.S. 391, 426 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concedes
impossibility of enumerating exhaustive list of protected documents).
"7 Id. at 426.
31)8 Id. at 427.
"9 Id.
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nan concludes, establishing even a partial list of documents residing
within the zone of privacy proves impossible. 51 "
Nomenclature of documents raises additional problems for the
establishment of a list. Although nearly everyone wants to protect the
contents of personal diaries, the term "diary" contemplates several
possible documents, including appointment books and daily planners,
as well as small, locked notebooks. The use of the term "diary" within
the circuits illustrates the problem. 3 " The Second Circuit, for example,
recently characterized daily planners as diaries, and recognized them
to be of a highly personal nature. 312 Yet, the Fourth Circuit indicates
that day planners and calendars defy categorical characterization as
corporate or personal. 313 The term "personal diary" may suffer either
under or over inclusiveness; either providing inadequate protection to
intimately personal documents, or providing contents-based protection
to documents lacking that intimately personal nature.
A standard against which courts can determine whether a docu-
ment merits Fifth Amendment privacy protection proves equally dif-
ficult to establish. Several courts and commentators have suggested
standards. 41 ' Justice Brennan, while declining to offer a universal stand-
ard, suggests disclosure as a guideline.315 Brennan reasons that an
individual's disclosure of a document to a third party reduces any
expectation of privacy in that document.° Brennan identifies two
examples in which disclosure fails as an adequate standard. 317 Personal
letters, an individual's thoughts disclosed to a third party, enjoy a
31° Id. at 426.
311 The circuits' uses of "diary" vary significantly. See, e.g., United States v. Wujkowski, 929
E2d 981, 984 (4th Cir. 1991) (court cannot state categorically that such things as appointment
books, day planners, and pocket calendars are intrinsically either corporate or personal); United
States v. Mason, 869 E2c1 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989) (no protection for pocket sized "day-timers"
notebooks); United States v. McCollum, 815 F.2d 1087, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987) (personal checks
distinguished from "personal diary" and not protected).
312 See In se Grand Jury Duces Tecum, I F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (2d Cir. 1993).
333 See Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 984.
314 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U,S. 391, 424 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(several standards discussed); In re Steinberg, 837 E2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988) (court applies use
standard, declining to protect notebooks that show no "highly personal" entries); United States
v (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834, 840 (4th Cir. 1984) (standard considers whether incriminating
papers are in personal possession and held in individual, as opposed to a representative capacity);
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir, 1981) (standard considers various factors
including whether incriminating papers are in actual or constructive possession of individual,
held in individual and not representative capacity, authored by holder or under holder's super-
vision); see also Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Cimstitulionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 limtv. L. Rev. 945, 988 (1977).
315 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425.
516 See id.
317 Id. at 427.
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peculiarly personal aspect, according to Brennan, that merits Fifth
Amendment protection." Brennan would also apply contents-based
protection to canceled personal checks in some situations, because
they provide clear insights into a person's total lifestyle. 3 ' 9 Ultimately,
Brennan's exceptions will simply swallow the rule. Thus, disclosure
alone cannot militate which documents merit Fifth Amendment pro-
tection.
Other efforts to define a standard for contents-based privacy simi-
larly fail to provide the necessary analytical framework for lower courts
to determine which documents merit protection. In United Slates v.
Davis, for example, the Fifth Circuit offered contents-based protection
for "any incriminating papers in the actual or constructive possession
of an individual, which he holds in his individual capacity, rather than
in a representative capacity, and which he himself wrote or which were
written under his immediate supervision."32°An application of the Fifth
Circuit standard requires a determination of constructive possession,
circumstances of authorship, including what constitutes immediate
supervision, and the capacity of the individual who wrote the papers.
One commentator urges courts to "secure a significant range of human
experience intimately related to the private aspect of personality," and
then to "impose limitations on the protection afforded in a principled
manner consistent with the values underlying the right." 321 These stand-
ards ultimately leave courts groping for an analytical foundation, and
reduce courts to case-by-case, ad hoc determinations of Fifth Amend-
ment privacy. The standards also leave law enforcement officials, attor-
neys and individuals under subpoena unsure as to what may or may
not be demanded by subpoena. Indeed, the establishment of a work-
able Fifth Amendment standard for personal documents, independent
of a subjective characterization of the documents in any given case,
may, in part, have driven the Court in Fisher. 322
2. Policy Problems of a Fifth Amendment Protection of Privacy
As a policy matter, a malleable, Fifth Amendment protection of
privacy, with no explicit textual support, fails to reliably protect the
contents of intimately personal documents. Both circuit courts and
commentators argue that the penumbral right to privacy can and
318 1d.
3IS Id.
32° United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981).
321 See Note, supra note 314, at 988.
322 See 425 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., concurring) (characterizes act of production approach
as replacement for prior, ad hoc, contents-based approach).
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ought to encompass protection for personal docurnents. 323 The penum-
bral right to privacy outlined in Griswold, however, protects privacy of
a different nature than compelled production of personal diaries. 324
Specifically, the right extends to certain personal activities such as
marital, sexual and reproductive matters." 5 The extension of the pri-
vacy protection of the marital relationship to personal papers would
imply a nearly unlimited application of the penumbral right to and
protection of privacy. An extension of the penumbral right to a situ-
ation so removed from the context in which the Court created the
penumbral right would invite attempts to assert a right to privacy
against government actions of all types. The Supreme Court cautions
against the very type of extension of the penumbral right to privacy an
application to personal diaries would require. 326 The Court's asserted
unwillingness to expand the penumbral right to privacy beyond its
current context likely precludes any extension of that right to personal
diaries."7
Nor does the Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of
documents, as currently construed, offer a sound basis for protection
of personal diaries. As the sources of that right lie neither in constitu-
tional text nor legislation, the scope of that right varies with time and
court. In Fisher, the Court simply trimmed and redefined its own
judicially created protection to fit within the confines of the Fifth
Amendment as the Court now interprets the Fifth Amendment. 928 A
consideration of the progression from Boyd to Fisher leads to the con-
clusion that the scope of Fifth Amendment privacy, rather than pro-
viding consistent protection for personal documents such as diaries,
will continue to change and evolve. True protection for such docu-
ments, therefore, must come from other analyses.
B. The Act of Production as a Guardian of Privacy
Rather than fear that the demise of a privacy approach heralds
the end of private documents, proponents of personal paper protec-
323 See In s Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1980); see also LaVacca,
supra note 181, at 417; Notc , supra note 314, at 988.
32t
	 Nown K & RoTtisinn, supra note 189, at 757; see also LaVacca, supra note 181, at 415.
425 See NOWA K & RoruNnA supra note 189, at 757. Nowak and Rotunda indicate that the
penumbral right may he even more limited, in that the Court has not recognized a right to engage
in any sexual activity done in private. Id.
326 See id. at 798.
327 See id. at 798. In Bowers v. Hardwick, for example, the majority indicates that there should
be great resistance to expanding the substantive reach of the right to privacy, particularly if it
requires the redefining of rights deemed to be itmclamental. See id
528 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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tion ought to welcome Fisher and Doe. By implementing act of produc-
tion analysis, the Supreme Court has gone a long way toward eliminat-
ing the vagaries of the analytically imprecise Boyd contents-based ap-
proach.329 Within the realm of private or personal papers, certain types
seem intrinsically more private than others. The act of production
protection will more consistently safeguard the most intimate of per-
sonal documents, such as diaries, while allowing subpoena of those
personal documents that do not carry such high expectations of pri-
vacy, such as canceled checks. Thus, where the ad hoc, privacy-based
protection may fail to protect documents of a truly intimately personal
nature and protect personal documents lacking such a personal na-
ture, the clearer guidelines of the act of production doctrine, though
neither perfect nor fail-safe, will generally protect truly private docu-
men ts.
The act of production doctrine espoused in Fisher triggers Fifth
Amendment protection when the act of producing a document con-
veys a testimonial communication, such as the existence, possession or
authentication of the documents sought. 33° The key component of a
truly intimate, personal diary, secrecy, ensures that others will rarely
know of its existence or possession, or be familiar with it to provide
independent authentication."' Indeed, many diary writers trace Sena-
tor Packwood's difficulties to the fact that rather than keep them
secret, he dictated them to a secretary, and then raised them as a
defense during his deposition . 332 The act of producing a truly intimate
diary, however, will generally concede either existence, possession or
authentication, and will be protected by the Fifth Amendment.
A document such as a canceled check, however, that lacks the
intimately personal nature of a diary, may not merit the same protec-
tion as a personal diary. 333 Although such a document may reveal
information about an individual's personal life, it cannot be described
as intimately personal. A canceled check reveals no more to the gov-
ernment through a subpoena than it reveals to a chain of third parties,
including the payee and the bank officials who release the funds. 3" To
the extent that third parties could establish existence, possession or
329 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431 (Marshall acknowledges analytical imprecision or prior docu-
ments analysis).
55} See id, at 410.
331 See id. at 433 (Marshall, J., concurring).
332 See Williams, supra note 32, at C4.
555 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 426.
334
 See id. at 427.
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authentication, the Fifth Amendment should not protect a canceled
check 395
Fisher also requires that the act of production, not the contents of
the document, provide incriminating testimonial communication." 6
According to Justice Marshall's concurrence, a testimonial act of pro-
duction becomes incriminating when that act provides the sole lead to
other incriminating evidence:3" Thus, while no crime results from
keeping a diary, the act of production of that diary would become
incriminating if it led to incriminating evidence. 3" One commentator
asserts that the act of production protection thus places an overly
difficult burden on prosecutors and investigators who must show inde-
pendent sources of incriminating evidence."' That burden, however,
effectively protects the privacy of personal documents, and will better
serve to protect the sanctity of intimately personal documents than will
a continually evolving, imputed Fifth Amendment protection of pri-
vacy.
The shift from a contents-based protection to an act of production
protection results in additional privacy safeguards. Courts that imple-
ment a contents-based protection may require an in camera inspection
to determine the precise nature of the contested document. By focus-
ing on the act of production, however, an individual may avoid pro-
ducing a personal diary even for the court's inspection, further safe-
guarding the privacy of that document. Second, the replacement of an
ad hoc, case-by-case Fifth Amendment analysis with clear guidelines
and standards will allow for planning. Thus, one who desires incontro-
vertible privacy in a personal document such as a diary will not, for
example, hire someone to transcribe it for him, disclose it voluntarily
to a Senate committee, or speak at length about it on the floor of the
Senate.""
35 Arguably, someone seeking to avoid providing insights into his or her lifestyle or associa-
tions will pay in cash.
"6 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11.
337 See id. at 433.
"8 See id. Marshall would protect the act of production if he saw a substantial danger that
the act of production would lead to incriminating evidence. Id.
"9 See Samuel A. Alitodr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT.
L. RE v. 27, 77-78 (198G) (author concludes that act of production places onerous burdens on
prosecutors).
A4u As one commentator indicates, the most reli able protection may come not from the Court,
but from Congress, through the adoption of legislation defining and clarifying the scope of
documents that can be compelled. See Alito, supra note 339, at 80-81. In the absence of imminent
legislative activity in this area, however, the act of production approach is a vast improvement
over the ad hoc, contents-based approach to Fifth Amendment analysis.
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CONCLUSION
By failing to overrule Boyd and thus providing two possible Fifth
Amendment document analyses, the Supreme Court has laid down a
smoke screen behind which lower courts may continue to enforce a
Boyd style grant of privacy through the Fifth Amendment and under-
mine document subpoenas. Given both the practical and philosophical
difficulties in consistently applying a privacy standard, and the strong
dicta in Fisher against such Fifth Amendment privacy protection, courts
should shift from a privacy analysis to an act of production analysis in
all documents cases. The Fisher act of production analysis fits within
the Court's current view of the Fifth Amendment, and provides a
standard that lower courts can apply consistently. The emphasis on the
act of producing the documents and not on the contents of the docu-
ments will ultimately provide greater protection for truly intimate and
personal documents, but will not tend to shield personal documents
of a less private nature.
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